South Africa v. Israel, side by side

International Court of Justice · General List No. 192

Side by Side Case Argumentation

1Did Israel intend to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as a group?

South Africa

Yes. Israel’s leaders said so “in explicit terms,” soldiers repeated it on the ground, and the pattern of what was done fits it. The evidence is “overwhelming and incontrovertible.”

Israel

No. The quotes are “random assertions” that go against government policy. Israel’s aim is to defeat Hamas and free the hostages, and its warnings to civilians and its aid efforts are “the very opposite of intent to destroy.”

CourtNot decided. In January 2024 the court quoted three statements by Israeli officials and found the rights South Africa wanted protected plausible. Judge Nolte, who voted with the majority, wrote that he did not find it plausible that the military operation itself was being carried out with genocidal intent.

CR 2024/1 p. 33 · CR 2024/2 p. 31, p. 49 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 52, 54 · Nolte declaration ¶ 15

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

Israel’s intent to destroy shows in three places at once: in what its leaders and commanders said, in soldiers repeating those words as they fought, and in a pattern of conduct, from the siege to the destruction of hospitals, that points the same way. An intent to destroy Hamas doesn’t rule out an intent to destroy the group.

Rests on

Statements the court itself quoted, among them the defense minister’s “complete siege” with “no electricity, no food, no fuel” and his “we are fighting human animals,” the president’s “an entire nation out there that is responsible,” and the prime minister’s reference to Amalek. Videos of soldiers repeating such words. The scale of the killing and destruction.

CR 2024/1 pp. 33–35, 42 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶ 38

Authority

The court’s order in The Gambia v. Myanmar (2020), where it said intent doesn’t have to be proved to get emergency orders. For the final ruling, the court’s cases on reading intent from a pattern of conduct.

Where it is weak

For a final ruling the court has only accepted intent read from conduct when it was the only reasonable inference. Israel points to other explanations for the same conduct, and some of the statements can be read as being about Hamas, as Judge Nolte noted.

Israel

The argument

There’s no intent to destroy anyone. Israel’s intention is to defend itself, end the threat and rescue the hostages. What counts as the state’s intent is what its decision-makers decided, and the decisions of the war cabinet and the security cabinet stress avoiding harm to civilians and letting aid in. Quotes from people outside those bodies, or taken out of context, aren’t policy.

Rests on

Excerpts from cabinet decisions Israel gave the court. The attorney general’s public warning that calls to harm civilians may be a crime. Evacuation warnings, pauses in fighting and aid deliveries, which it says no one bent on destruction would make.

CR 2024/2 pp. 31–32, 49 · 74

Authority

The court’s genocide cases against Serbia (2007) and Croatia (2015), which set the strict test for intent. The United States argued in 2026 that the court should keep it.

Where it is weak

The court quoted the president and two ministers anyway, and Judge Nolte wrote that the statements were “at least highly ambiguous” in their “dehumanizing and indiscriminate language.” The cabinet decisions Israel showed the court aren’t public.

Nolte declaration ¶ 15 · United States ¶ 20

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Without a written plan, is an intent to destroy the group the only reasonable conclusion from what was said and done?
South Africa
Leaders said it outright, soldiers echoed it, and the conduct matches.
The words

The court quoted the defense minister, the president and a minister on Gaza as a whole.

The words

Those are random quotes. The war cabinet’s decisions are the policy, and they protect civilians.
Israel
Warnings to leave, aid and pauses are the opposite of intent, so it isn’t the only conclusion.
South Africa
Wanting to destroy Hamas doesn’t rule out wanting to destroy the group as well.
Where it lands
Rights found plausible in 2024, on a low test. Nothing has been decided. The judgment turns on this.

2Are the deaths and destruction acts the treaty lists?

South Africa

Yes. Mass killing, serious harm, displacement into conditions that can’t sustain life, and the attack on Gaza’s health system are each acts on the treaty’s list.

Israel

No. This is a war in crowded cities against an enemy that hides among civilians. The treaty “was not designed to address the brutal impact of intensive hostilities on the civilian population.”

CourtNot decided. The court described the deaths, the “massive destruction of homes” and the displacement of most of the population, and said at least some of what South Africa alleged “appear to be capable of falling within” the treaty.

CR 2024/1 pp. 23–25 · CR 2024/2 p. 13 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 30, 46

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

Israel has done four of the five listed acts: killing Palestinians in Gaza in large numbers, causing serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy them, and preventing births. Ordering more than a million people to move to places without shelter, food or water is itself one of those conditions.

Rests on

The UN’s casualty figures, which the court used. The first evacuation order of October 13, 2023, covering over a million people. Damage to hospitals and the blocking of medical supplies.

CR 2024/1 pp. 23, 25–30

Authority

Article II of the Genocide Convention, which lists the acts.

Where it is weak

Acts like these happen in many wars, and the treaty only reaches them when the intent is there too. So this question can’t be won on its own. The casualty figures come from Gaza’s health authorities, and the court said they “cannot be independently verified.”

Israel

The argument

Civilian deaths in urban warfare can be the tragic and unintended result of lawful attacks on military targets, and the place to judge them is the law of war, not the genocide treaty. Hamas fights from homes, hospitals and UN buildings, and the harm that follows is its responsibility as much as anyone’s.

Rests on

Video and accounts of the October 7 attack. Evidence of Hamas fighting from civilian sites and tunnels. Israel’s description of its warnings and its targeting rules.

CR 2024/2 pp. 13–20, 24

Authority

The court’s 1999 orders in the Kosovo cases, which said that using force can’t in itself be genocide.

Where it is weak

The court didn’t accept that the law of war pushes the treaty aside, and found that some of the alleged acts could fall under it. Israel’s answer here is mostly about why things happened, which is the intent question, more than about whether they happened.

Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶ 30

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Were Palestinians in Gaza killed, seriously harmed or put in conditions of life meant to destroy them?
South Africa
The numbers, the evacuation orders and the hospitals show all three.
How to judge it

These are the treaty’s acts, whatever else they also are.

How to judge it

This is war, and the law of war is the yardstick.
Israel
Hamas’s way of fighting is why so many civilians are harmed.
Where it lands
At least some acts “appear to be capable of falling within” the treaty. A first look, not a finding.

3Is Israel responsible for the hunger in Gaza?

South Africa

Yes. “Palestinian children are starving to death as a direct result of the deliberate acts and omissions of Israel,” including blocking aid and moving to cut off UNRWA.

Israel

No. Israel rejects that “in the strongest terms.” It says it is getting aid in by land, sea and air, that Hamas steals aid, and that the problems are “inherent to any theatre of active hostilities.”

CourtNot decided as to blame. The court said in March 2024 that “famine is setting in” and unanimously ordered Israel to let aid in at scale. It quoted the UN human rights chief, who put the hunger down to Israel’s restrictions, without making that finding itself.

South Africa, Mar 6, 2024 ¶ 8 · Order of Mar 28, 2024 ¶¶ 17, 21, 33–34, 51

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

Hunger in Gaza isn’t a side effect. It comes from a siege announced two days into the war, from limits on what aid gets in, from attacks on people waiting for food, and from Israel’s campaign against the UN agency that most of Gaza depends on. Inflicting that on purpose is one of the treaty’s listed acts.

Rests on

The UN hunger monitor’s warnings of famine. The deaths of children from malnutrition reported in early 2024. Its claim that Israel used aid as a “bargaining chip in negotiations.”

South Africa, Mar 6, 2024 ¶¶ 8–11 · CR 2024/1 pp. 25–30

Authority

Article II(c) of the treaty, on conditions of life calculated to destroy a group.

Where it is weak

The court’s orders are about getting aid in, and the court didn’t say who caused the hunger. Israel points to Hamas taking aid and to the difficulty of delivering in a war, and those questions of fact are still open.

Israel

The argument

Israel has worked to get food, water, fuel and medicine into Gaza through crossings, a maritime route, a floating pier and air drops, and with UN agencies. The hunger, where it exists, is a result of the war Hamas started, of fighting in a densely populated place, and of Hamas taking aid for its fighters.

Rests on

Numbers of trucks and crossings, figures on bakeries and water lines reopened, and footage Israel says shows Hamas commandeering aid trucks.

CR 2024/2 p. 47 · Order of Mar 28, 2024 ¶ 29 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶ 64

Authority

The law of war, which governs aid in wartime, and Israel’s position that it goes beyond what that law asks.

Where it is weak

The court found the situation got worse after its January order, and ordered more land crossings in March and the Rafah crossing kept open in May. In August 2025 the UN-backed hunger monitor confirmed famine in Gaza City, which Israel rejects.

Order of Mar 28, 2024 ¶ 18 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 52 · UN monthly bulletin, Aug 2025

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Were Palestinians in Gaza deliberately put in conditions meant to destroy them, by starvation among other things?
South Africa
The siege and the limits on aid were deliberate, and children died of hunger.
Israel
Aid is going in, Hamas steals it, and war makes delivery hard.
Who caused it

Israel controls every way in. The cause is its restrictions.

Who caused it

The war and Hamas are the cause. Israel is easing the way.
Where it lands
Famine “setting in” and aid “at scale” ordered, unanimously. Who is to blame is undecided.

4Does October 7 and the right to self-defense change anything?

South Africa

No. South Africa condemns the attack, but “no armed attack on a State’s territory no matter how serious” can justify or excuse breaking the genocide treaty.

Israel

Yes, as the context. Israel was attacked and has a right and a duty to defend its citizens and free the hostages. Stopping its operations would “deny Israel its ability” to do that and leave Hamas “free to continue.”

CourtMostly left for later. The court called for the hostages’ release in all three orders and never ordered Israel to stop its operations everywhere. Judge Tladi wrote that South Africa is plainly right that self-defense can’t justify genocide, and that Israel never answered the charge of a grossly disproportionate response.

CR 2024/1 pp. 19–20 · CR 2024/2 p. 16 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 42 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶ 85 · Tladi declaration ¶¶ 14–15

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

Three things. Self-defense can never be a defense to genocide. Israel’s response is out of all proportion to the attack. And a country can’t claim self-defense against territory it occupies, which South Africa says Gaza is.

Rests on

South Africa’s own condemnation of the attack, repeated to Israel in December 2023. The court’s 2004 opinion on the wall in the West Bank, and the UN’s position that Gaza remains occupied.

CR 2024/1 p. 19 · CR 2024/1 p. 80

Authority

The 2004 advisory opinion on the wall, on self-defense and occupied territory.

Where it is weak

Whether Gaza was occupied on October 7, 2023 is disputed, and Judge Tladi said that point is best left to the merits. The first point is true but only matters once genocide is proved.

Israel

The argument

The case erases the attack that started the war and Hamas’s responsibility for it. Israel has a right to defend itself, recognized by many states, and an order to stop would reward Hamas for fighting from among civilians. “If there have been acts that may be characterized as genocidal, then they have been perpetrated against Israel.”

Rests on

Evidence of the October 7 attack and the hostages’ treatment. The number of hostages still held. Statements by other countries backing Israel’s right to defend itself.

CR 2024/2 pp. 14–16 · CR 2024/28 p. 30

Authority

Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right of self-defense.

Where it is weak

Self-defense doesn’t answer the accusation, because both sides accept it can’t justify genocide. Judge Tladi said Israel’s security argument offered “a false choice between two extremes.”

Tladi declaration ¶ 16

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Can the attack of October 7 and the right of self-defense affect whether the treaty was broken?
South Africa
No attack, however terrible, can justify genocide.
Israel
Agreed in principle. But the case hides who started the war and why Israel fights.
What follows

The response is disproportionate, and Gaza is occupied.

What follows

Stopping would leave Hamas free and the hostages held.
Where it lands
Hostages’ release called for, no general halt ordered. Self-defense is no defense to genocide, and both sides accept that.

5Should the Rafah offensive have stopped?

South Africa

Yes. Rafah was the “last refuge” for 1.5 million people, and the offensive was “deliberately inflicting on Palestinians conditions of life” meant to destroy them. Israel should withdraw from all of Gaza.

Israel

No. These were “specific, limited and localized operations prefaced with evacuation efforts,” against “a military stronghold for Hamas,” with a humanitarian area set aside and expanded for those who left.

CourtPartly. The court wasn’t convinced Israel had kept civilians safe and ordered it to “immediately halt” the offensive, but only in so far as it “may inflict” conditions of life that could destroy the group. Judges read that limit in different ways.

South Africa, May 10, 2024 ¶ 11 · CR 2024/28 p. 11 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶¶ 46, 57

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

The offensive on Rafah was a new and worse stage. Israel took both crossings, cut off aid and pushed hundreds of thousands toward Al-Mawasi, an area without shelter, water or sanitation, and there was nowhere safe left. The only measure that would work was a full stop and a withdrawal.

Rests on

UN reports that about 800,000 people fled Rafah in under two weeks, that one of the last hospitals there stopped working, and that the World Food Programme lost access to its warehouse.

South Africa, May 10, 2024 ¶¶ 10–11 · CR 2024/27 p. 12, 42 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 45

Authority

The court’s power to change its own emergency orders when the situation changes.

Where it is weak

The court didn’t order a withdrawal from Gaza, and the measure it gave has a condition attached that Israel says its operations met.

Israel

The argument

The operations were limited, step by step, and preceded by warnings to specific areas. Israel opened a new crossing, supported a floating pier, and set up and enlarged a humanitarian area with field hospitals and tents. Hostages were held and Hamas battalions were in Rafah, and stopping would have left both untouched.

Rests on

Israel’s written answer to Judge Nolte’s question, describing the humanitarian area, routes and supplies, including 40,000 tents bought and 7,000 delivered.

Israel’s answer, May 18, 2024 · CR 2024/28 p. 11 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶¶ 40–41

Authority

Its right of self-defense, and the condition written into the court’s own measure.

Where it is weak

The court said Israel “has not provided sufficient information” on the safety of people leaving, or on water, food and shelter for 800,000 in Al-Mawasi. Israel argued in May with no outside counsel, after being refused a week’s delay.

Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 46 · CR 2024/28 pp. 8–9

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Did the Rafah offensive create a new risk of conditions of life that could destroy the group?
South Africa
The last refuge was attacked, the crossings closed and 800,000 people pushed out.
Israel
Limited operations, warnings in advance, and an enlarged humanitarian area.
What the order means

Halt the offensive.

What the order means

Halt only what may inflict those conditions, which we don’t.
Where it lands
Ordered 13 to 2 to halt, with a condition. The judges themselves read the condition differently.

6Has Israel done enough about public calls for genocide?

South Africa

No. Officials and soldiers made genocidal statements and nobody was punished, which South Africa says “constitutes in itself a grave violation” of the treaty.

Israel

Yes. Its attorney general announced that any call for intentional harm to civilians “may amount to a criminal offence, including the offence of incitement,” and that several cases were being examined.

CourtOrdered in January 2024, sixteen votes to one, that Israel prevent and punish direct and public incitement. The court said the attorney general’s steps were “to be encouraged” but not enough to remove the risk.

Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 38, 73, 86 · CR 2024/2 p. 74

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

Senior officials spoke about Gaza in dehumanizing terms, the words spread to soldiers, and the government neither condemned nor punished them. The treaty makes incitement a breach in its own right, so this holds even if the court doesn’t find a genocide.

Rests on

Statements by the president, ministers and commanders, and videos of soldiers repeating them, shown at the January hearing.

CR 2024/1 pp. 33–41

Authority

Articles III(c) and IV of the treaty, which require punishing incitement, including by officials.

Where it is weak

Whether a statement is “direct” incitement, and not just ugly language, is a legal question the court hasn’t answered, and some statements can be read as being about Hamas.

Israel

The argument

Statements that go beyond what Israeli law allows are against its policy and are being looked at by its law enforcement. Some, like a remark by a minister outside the war cabinet, were rejected by the prime minister and other ministers right away.

Rests on

The attorney general’s public statement, given to the court in January 2024. Statements disowning the minister’s remark.

CR 2024/2 p. 32, 74

Authority

Israel’s own criminal law and its independent attorney general.

Where it is weak

Nothing in the court’s public record shows anyone charged. Israel’s own judge voted for the incitement measure “in the hope” it would “discourage damaging rhetoric.” Judge Nolte wrote in May 2024 that he was concerned by reports of continuing statements.

Barak opinion ¶ 44 · Nolte declaration ¶¶ 22–24

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Did Israel take the measures in its power to prevent and punish public calls for genocide?
South Africa
The statements were made and went unpunished.
Israel
The attorney general warned they may be crimes, and cases are being examined.
Where it lands
Ordered to prevent and punish, 16 to 1, with Israel’s judge voting for it. Whether it has is undecided.

7Has Israel obeyed the court’s orders?

South Africa

No. South Africa says Israel committed “ongoing manifest violations” from the start, and told the court in August 2026 that “Israel has not complied with the Orders.”

Israel

Yes. Israel says it “has engaged fully and sincerely,” filed detailed reports on what it did, and that the measures in place were “entirely sufficient.” After the Rafah order its national security adviser said, “We did not commit genocide and we will not commit genocide.”

CourtNot decided. Each later order says it is “without prejudice to any findings concerning the Respondent’s compliance.” Three judges monitor compliance in private.

South Africa, Mar 6, 2024 p. 1 · DIRCO, Aug 28, 2026 · CR 2024/28 p. 21 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶¶ 39, 55 · Reporting: Times of Israel, May 25, 2024

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

The death toll kept rising after each order, famine set in after the first, Rafah was attacked after the court said the January measures covered it, and investigators and journalists were kept out. Since the October 2025 ceasefire, South Africa says, a child has been killed on average every day.

Rests on

Its requests of March and May 2024, its dossiers to the UN Security Council in 2024 and 2025, and a dossier to the court’s monitoring committee in August 2026, which isn’t public.

South Africa, Mar 6, 2024 p. 1 · South Africa, May 10, 2024 ¶ 11

Authority

The court’s rule that its emergency orders are binding.

Where it is weak

The court hasn’t made any finding on compliance, and South Africa’s dossier and Israel’s reports are both confidential.

Israel

The argument

Israel has taken its obligations seriously and reported to the court in February and April 2024. Its officials read the Rafah order as conditional, allowing operations that don’t risk destroying the population, so they said it didn’t stop what Israel was doing there.

Rests on

Its compliance reports of February 26 and April 29, 2024, which aren’t public, and its description of aid and evacuation efforts.

CR 2024/28 p. 21 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 39 · Reporting: Times of Israel, May 25, 2024

Authority

The wording of the orders themselves, which mostly restate duties Israel says it already had.

Where it is weak

The court found in March and May 2024 that the situation had kept getting worse, and Israel hasn’t answered South Africa’s 2026 dossier in public.

Order of Mar 28, 2024 ¶ 18 · Order of May 24, 2024 ¶ 28

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Has Israel carried out the measures the court ordered in January, March and May 2024?
South Africa
Things got worse after every order, and Rafah was attacked anyway.
Israel
Israel reported fully, and the orders allow what it did.
Where it lands
The court has left compliance for later. Its monitoring committee works in private.

8Can the court hear this case at all?

South Africa

Yes. Both countries accepted Article IX with no reservation, and South Africa told Israel at the UN and in writing that it was breaking the treaty. “What more evidence could be required to establish a dispute?”

Israel

No. South Africa “did not give Israel a reasonable opportunity” to respond and ignored its offer to meet, so there was no real dispute. In March 2026 Israel objected to the court’s power and to the case being heard at all.

CourtYes for now, not finally. The court found prima facie that it has power, refused to remove the case from its list, and said none of that “prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits.”

CR 2024/1 p. 46 · CR 2024/2 p. 28 · Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 31–32, 84 · Order of May 21, 2026 p. 3

Detailthe argument, what it rests on, where it is weak

South Africa

The argument

A dispute existed well before December 29, 2023. South Africa had accused Israel at the Security Council and the General Assembly, sent a formal note, and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. The treaty doesn’t require talks first, and insisting on them “would simply be a licence to commit genocide.”

Rests on

South Africa’s statement to the General Assembly of December 12, 2023, its note of December 21, and Israel’s foreign ministry calling the accusation “morally repugnant.”

CR 2024/1 pp. 42–47

Authority

The court’s past rulings that a dispute is a matter of substance, judged objectively, and that every member of the treaty has standing to enforce it.

Where it is weak

Israel’s 2026 objections are confidential, so South Africa’s answer to them isn’t known yet. It is due with its reply on November 22, 2027.

Israel

The argument

South Africa didn’t give Israel a real chance to engage before filing, and its notes looked like an effort to manufacture a dispute at the last moment. Israel says the court “lacks jurisdiction” and that South Africa’s allegations should be dismissed “in their entirety.”

Rests on

Israel’s note of December 27, 2023 proposing a meeting. Its counter-memorial of March 2026, which isn’t public.

CR 2024/2 pp. 25–28 · Israel MFA, Mar 14, 2026

Authority

The court’s case law requiring the two sides’ views to be “positively opposed” before a case is filed.

Where it is weak

The court has already found, at first sight, that the two countries held “clearly opposite views.” What Israel argues in 2026 can’t be judged until its answer is public.

Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶ 28

Logic chainhow the reasoning runs, and where it breaks

Test
Was there a real dispute about the genocide treaty when South Africa filed, and is the case one the court should hear?
South Africa
Accusations at the UN, a formal note and Israel’s own denial show a dispute.
Israel
No chance to respond, and the offer to meet was ignored.
Talks first?

The treaty doesn’t require them.

Talks first?

Not talks, but a reasonable chance to answer.
Where it lands
Power found at first sight in 2024. Israel’s 2026 objections will be decided with the rest.

Back to the case

Notes

How this was made, and what it leaves out

Source

Built from the court’s own public record of the case: South Africa’s application, the three orders of 2024 and every judge’s opinion on them, the verbatim records of the four hearings, the written requests and answers the court has published, its press releases, and its orders since. Every characterization of a side comes from that side’s own words in court or in a published filing, and every finding is quoted from the order it’s in.

Each citation opens the court’s own document, at the page where one is given. The court’s website sometimes checks a browser before it hands over a file, so a link can take a moment.

ICJ, case 192

What isn’t public

Most of the case. The full written arguments, South Africa’s memorial of October 2024 and Israel’s counter-memorial of March 2026, are confidential under the court’s rules until it decides to publish them, which usually happens when the hearings on them open. So are the reports Israel has filed on how it’s carrying out the orders, and the evidence South Africa sent the court in August 2026 about whether it is.

South Africa has said its memorial runs to more than 750 pages, with more than 4,000 pages of evidence behind it. Israel has said its answer shows the court has no power over the case. Beyond that, these pages can’t say what either one argues, and the Side by Side View quotes each side from what it said in court in 2024.

DIRCO, Oct 28, 2024 · Order of May 21, 2026

Names and numbers

Numbers here come with whose numbers they are. The court’s first order used United Nations figures that came from the health authorities in Gaza and said they “cannot be independently verified”: 25,700 Palestinians killed by January 24, 2024. The same authorities’ count passed 73,000 by August 2026, which is the number South Africa gave the court that month. For October 7, 2023, the court’s figures are more than 1,200 people killed in Israel and some 240 taken hostage.

People are named here when they spoke in court, wrote an opinion, or were quoted by the court. The statements by Israeli officials quoted on these pages are the ones the court itself quoted in January 2024.

Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 13, 46, 52 · DIRCO, Aug 28, 2026

What this is not

Not legal advice, not a finding, and not a verdict. The court has not decided whether genocide happened. Its 2024 orders found that the rights South Africa wanted protected were plausible, which is a much lower test. Joan Donoghue, who was president of the court when it gave the first order, said afterward that “the shorthand that often appears, which is that there’s a plausible case of genocide, isn’t what the court decided.”

Other bodies have looked at the war in Gaza in other ways: the International Criminal Court, which tries people, the same court’s advisory opinions, and a United Nations commission of inquiry. None of that is part of this case, and where these pages mention it they say so. Where the record doesn’t reach, these pages say so and stop.

Order of Jan 26, 2024 ¶¶ 30, 54 · BBC HARDtalk, Apr 25, 2024

Tell me what I got wrong

If something here is missed, misrepresented or unfairly portrayed, let me know. Point me at a filing or record and I will verify it on my end. I actively look to correct, improve and remain unbiased.

No account, no name, no email. The submission stores what you typed, your address and your browser string, to make abuse traceable and for nothing else.

Record reviewed through October 14, 2026. Nothing filed after that date is reflected here.

Terms

Plain English

Words these pages use because the court uses them. A few are special to this court, which judges countries and not people, and to the treaty the case is about.

The court

International Court of Justice: The United Nations’ own court, in The Hague. It settles disputes between countries, not cases against people. It has 15 judges elected by the UN for nine years at a time, and it’s sometimes called the World Court.
Genocide Convention: The 1948 treaty that defines genocide and makes the countries that join it promise to prevent it and punish it. Israel joined in 1950 and South Africa in 1998.
Article IX: The clause of the Genocide Convention that lets one member take another to this court over a dispute about the treaty. It’s the only reason this court has the case.
Judge ad hoc: A judge a country picks for one case when no judge of its nationality is on the court. They sit and vote with the other judges.
President of the court: The judge the others elect to run the court and chair its hearings, for three years at a time.
Registrar: The head of the court’s staff. Keeps the record, sits with the judges at hearings, and reads out the French text of a ruling.
Agent: The official who speaks for a country in a case at this court, usually a diplomat or a government lawyer. A country can have co-agents who share the job.
Intervention: Another country asking to take part. Any member of the treaty can come in to argue how the treaty should be read, and is then bound by how the court reads it. It doesn’t become a party to the case.

The paperwork

General List: The court’s numbered list of its cases. This one is No. 192.
Application: The document that starts a case at this court. South Africa’s runs to 84 pages.
Memorial: The full written case of the country that sued, with its evidence. South Africa filed its in October 2024.
Counter-memorial: The full written answer of the country being sued. Israel filed its in March 2026.
Reply and rejoinder: A second round of writing. The country that sued answers the counter-memorial, and the other side answers that.
Confidential pleadings: The court’s rules keep the written arguments out of public view until the court decides to publish them, usually when the hearings on them open.
Verbatim record: The court’s word-for-word record of a hearing, numbered like CR 2024/1. Cited here by page.
Order: A written decision of the court on one step in a case. It isn’t the final judgment.

How a case moves

Provisional measures: Emergency orders the court can give while a case goes on, to stop harm that couldn’t be undone before the final ruling. They’re binding, but the court has no way of its own to enforce them.
Plausible: The test for emergency orders. The court asks if the rights a country wants protected plausibly exist and could be at risk. It isn’t a finding that the accusation is true.
Prima facie: At first sight. Before giving emergency orders the court only has to see, at first sight, that it may have power over the case.
Jurisdiction: The court’s power to hear a case at all. Here it comes only from Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
Dispute: A real disagreement between the two countries about the treaty. It has to exist when the case is filed. Israel argued in 2024 that there wasn’t one yet.
Admissibility: Whether a case the court has power over is still one it should hear, for example because of how it was brought.
Preliminary objections: A challenge to jurisdiction or admissibility filed early and decided on its own, before the main case. Israel didn’t file one. It put its objections in its counter-memorial instead, so they’re decided with everything else.
Standing: The right to bring a case. Every member of the Genocide Convention has a stake in it being kept, so any member can sue another without having been harmed itself.
Merits: The main question in a case, as opposed to steps along the way. Here, whether Israel broke the Genocide Convention.
Judgment: The court’s final decision. It’s binding on the two countries and there is no appeal.
Opinions and declarations: What a judge writes alongside a decision to explain a vote or add a point. A dissent explains a vote against. None of them changes the result.
Monitoring committee: Three judges the court set up in 2023 to follow whether its emergency orders are being carried out and suggest to the court what it could do.

The stamp on a ruling

Granted: The court said yes to the request on this card, whichever country made it.
Granted in part: The court ordered some of what was asked for and not the rest. It words its own orders, so they can differ from what either country asked for.
Denied: The court said no to the request on this card and ordered nothing new.

What the treaty says

Genocide: Under the treaty, any of five acts done with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such: killing its members, seriously harming them, imposing conditions of life meant to destroy it, preventing births, or taking its children.
The listed acts: The five acts in Article II of the treaty. On their own they aren’t genocide. They become genocide when an intent to destroy the group is behind them.
Specific intent: The intent to destroy the group as such, also called dolus specialis. It has to be there on top of the intent to do the act itself, and it’s what sets genocide apart from other crimes.
Only reasonable inference: The court’s test from its earlier genocide cases. Where no plan is proved, intent can be read from a pattern of conduct only if it’s the only conclusion that could reasonably be drawn from it.
Substantial part: The part of the group targeted has to be big enough to matter to the group as a whole. The court said in 2024 that Palestinians in Gaza, over 2 million people, are.
Direct and public incitement: Openly urging people to commit genocide. It breaks the treaty on its own, whether or not a genocide follows.
Duty to prevent: Each member has to do what it reasonably can to stop a genocide once it knows, or should know, of a serious risk of one. It’s only broken if a genocide actually happens.
State responsibility: This court judges countries, not people. It can find a state responsible for breaking the treaty. Putting individuals on trial is for criminal courts.
Law of war: The rules for fighting a war, also called international humanitarian law. They allow some harm to civilians but forbid targeting them or causing harm out of proportion to the military aim. This case isn’t about those rules.
Self-defense: A country’s right to use force when it’s attacked. Israel says its war in Gaza is self-defense. South Africa says self-defense can never excuse genocide.
Famine: The worst level on the hunger scale UN agencies and aid groups use, called the IPC. It means extreme lack of food, acute malnutrition and deaths from it, each past a set line.